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The private insurance industry feels that it cannot continue to provide coverage 
against hurricanes and earthquakes as it has done in the past without opening 
itself up to the possibility of insolvency or a significant loss of  surplus. This 
concern stems from a series of natural disasters in the United States since 1989 
that have resulted in unprecedented insured losses. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the magnitude of the catastrophic losses experienced by 
the insurance industry in the United States from 1961 to 1995. The graphic 
change from 1989 is obvious. Prior to the occurrence of  Hurricane Hugo in 
1989 (insured losses in that year were over $4 billion), the insurance industry 
had never suffered any losses from a single disaster of over $1 billion. Since 
that time, it has had ten disasters that have exceeded this amount (“Catastro- 
phes” 1996). 
Hurricane Andrew was the most severe disaster that the insurance industry 
has experienced to date. It swept ashore along the Florida coastline in August 
1992, causing insured losses from wind damage that topped $15 billion.’ Had 
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Fig. 4.1  Insured catastrophe losses in 1995 dollars 
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the storm taken a more northerly track and hit downtown Miami and Miami 
Beach, total insured damage could have  approached $50 billion. The storm 
forced the insurance industry to recognize that it might be subject to losses in 
the future way beyond any figures previously imagined.* 
On the West Coast of the United States, insured damage from the Northridge 
Earthquake of January 1994 exceeded $12 billion. Had a similar quake hit cen- 
tral Los Angeles, the insured bill could have been over $50 billion. The Kobe 
Earthquake in Japan, which occurred exactly one year after Northridge, caused 
substantially more damage, with estimates of  the costs of  repair at well over 
$100 billion. Since very few structures were insured, the cost to the insurance 
industry was  relatively small ($1 billion) (Scawthorn, Lashkari, and Naseer 
1997).  A repeat of the earthquake that destroyed Tokyo in 1923 could cost be- 
tween $900 billion and $1.4 trillion today (Valery 1995). 
The change in the character of  these disasters in recent years and the specter 
of  megacatastrophes in the future raise two fundamental questions: (1) What 
steps can be taken to reduce the losses from future disasters? (2) Who can and 
should pay for the costs of these events when they occur? 
This paper suggests an approach to evaluating the role of  insurance and 
other policy instruments for managing the catastrophic risk problem. The next 
section provides an overview of why traditional reinsurance mechanisms are 
limited in their ability to cover recent losses. It also indicates how  pooling 
arrangements at the state and federal levels have attempted to fill this void as 
well as the need for new sources of funds from the capital markets. 
Section 4.2 stresses the importance of understanding the decision processes 
of the key interested parties concerned with catastrophic losses and their inter- 
action with each other. On the basis of this descriptive characterization of the 
problem, section 4.3 proposes a conceptual framework for examining a set of 
alternative strategies by taking advantage of information technology, expanded 
databases, and modeling approaches now being used to analyze catastrophic 
risks. Section 4.4 utilizes this framework to examine the role that two policy 
instruments, reinsurance and mitigation, can play in dealing with catastrophic 
losses for a “model city” in California. The concluding section suggests ways 
to expand these analyses to include alternative decision rules and policy instru- 
ments in structuring and evaluating new approaches to managing catastrophic 
risks. 
4.1  Need for New Funding Sources 
Insurers have traditionally protected themselves through private reinsurance 
contracts whereby portions of their losses from a catastrophic disaster are cov- 
2. Six years prior to Andrew, an industry-sponsored study had been published, indicating the 
effect of  two $7 billion hurricanes on property-casualty insurance companies. The report indicated 
that no hurricane of that magnitude had ever occurred before but that “storms of that dollar magni- 
tude are now possible because of  the large concentrations of  property along the Gulf and Atlantic 
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ered by  some type of treaty or excess-loss arrangement. To illustrate, consider 
an excess-of-loss protection policy between a private insurer and a reinsurer 
where a 300/100 excess-loss layer was provided. This arrangement means that, 
if  losses from a specific earthquake exceed $300 million, the reinsurer will 
cover the next $100 million in losses. The insurer is responsible for covering 
losses above $400 million. The $300 million is designated as the attachment 
point, and the other end of the range, $400 million, is specified as the limit. 
The difference between these two points defines the amount of reinsurance in 
force. In return for this protection, the insurer pays the reinsurer a prespeci- 
fied premium. 
4.1.1  Role of Reinsurance 
Following the recent catastrophic disasters, insurers have been demanding 
more reinsurance coverage, but they are having a difficult time obtaining the 
layers that they require at prices that they consider affordable. If insurers were 
allowed to charge higher premiums on their own policies, many would need 
less reinsurance and would accept higher attachment points. However, regula- 
tory constraints, such as obtaining prior approval by the state insurance com- 
missioner of rate changes, limit insurers’ ability to raise premiums to levels 
that they feel reflect the risk. For example, in Florida, restrictions have been 
placed on rates that can be charged on homeowner’s coverage (which covers 
wind damage) in areas of the state affected by hurricanes (Lecomte and Gaha- 
gan 1998). 
Given the limitations on the amount of reinsurance that insurers can afford 
to purchase, they have  been greatly concerned with the maximum probable 
losses that they may experience from a severe hurricane or earthquake with 
their current book of business. This concern is not unfounded. Nine insurance 
companies were insolvent as a result of  Hurricane Andrew, adding to the fi- 
nancial burden of other insurers who were assessed for the claims of the insol- 
vent firms by the Florida Insurance Guarantee Fund. In fact, these post-Andrew 
assessments led  to  a tenth company becoming  insolvent  (Conning 8z  Co. 
1 994). 
Many insurers writing earthquake coverage in California have also been con- 
cerned with the possibility of insolvency or a significant loss of surplus follow- 
ing another major earthquake. Although there are no formal rate restrictions 
by the state Insurance Department, companies feel constrained on how high a 
rate they can charge and still maintain their credibility with the public. Further- 
more, they have been limited in the amount of reinsurance that they have been 
able to obtain owing to the capacity limits of the worldwide reinsurance market 
(Insurance Services Office 1996). In fact, shortly after the Northridge Earth- 
quake, Standard and Poor’s Insurance Rating Service identified ten insurance 
companies that would be in danger of failing if another major natural disaster 
occurred in California (Insurance Services Office 1994). 
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excess-loss reinsurance. The National Economic Council has recommended 
that the federal government offer catastrophe-reinsurance contracts that would 
be auctioned annually. The proposal would establish a program in which the 
Treasury would auction a limited number of excess-of-loss contracts covering 
industry losses between $25 and $50 billion from a single natural disaster. 
Insurers, reinsurers, and state and national reinsurance pools would be eligible 
purchasers (Lewis and Murdock 1996). 
4.1.2  Emergence of State Pools 
During the past five years, several states have established pools to provide 
either coverage or additional capacity following disasters. The first such ar- 
rangement was in Hawaii, where a hurricane relief fund was established after 
Hurricane Iniki (1992) to provide windstorm coverage for residential and com- 
mercial property. In Florida, a joint underwriting association was established 
in 1992 following Hurricane Andrew to issue policies to those homeowners 
who were refused coverage by  private insurers. Today, this residual market 
mechanism is the state’s third-largest property insurer, having underwritten al- 
most 900,000 policies and exposing itself to $100 billion in potential losses, 
much of that in southern Florida (Scism 1996). 
The Florida  Hurricane Catastrophe  Fund was created in  1992 with trust 
funds reimbursing insurers for a portion of their losses from future severe hur- 
ricanes. Above a predetermined retention level, insurers are provided with rein- 
surance benefits from the fund following a future catastrophic disaster. The 
current cash balance of the fund will not enable it to provide adequate protec- 
tion to insurers for hurricanes as costly as Hurricane Andrew (Insurance Ser- 
vices Office 1996). 
Since 1985, insurers in California have been required to offer earthquake 
coverage to anyone who has a homeowner’s policy with them. This created few 
problems until after the Northridge Earthquake, when many insurers felt that 
they could not risk selling any more earthquake policies in the state. In 1995, 
the California Insurance Department surveyed insurers and learned that up to 
90 percent of them had either placed restrictions on the sale of new homeown- 
er’s policies or stopped selling these policies completely (Roth 1998). 
As a result of this lack of availability of homeowner’s insurance following 
the Northridge  Earthquake,  a  state-run  earthquake-insurance  company was 
proposed. In September 1996, the state legislature approved the formation of 
the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), which provides coverage to home- 
owners with a 15 percent deductible. The CEA is an innovative arrangement 
that reflects a combination of both private and public funding to cover the in- 
sured losses from a catastrophic disaster. 
Table 4.1 depicts the different layers of coverage to finance the $10.5 billion 
funding requirement, assuming that all licensed insurance companies in the 
market participated. Insurers’ liability is limited to $6 billion ($1 billion in 
start-up assessments, $3 billion for the first layer of coverage to pay claims 154  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 





$2 billion  Industry-contingent assessment (after the earthquake)  $10.5 
$1.5 billion  Berkshire Hathaway  8.5 
$2 billion  Reinsurance (no reinstatement)  6 
$1 billion  Policyholder-contingent assessment  I 
$3 billion  Industry-contingent assessment (after the earthquake)  4 
$1 billion  Industry assessment (to start the program)  1 
Source: Roth (1998). 
after an earthquake, and another $2 billion if the insured damage exceeds $8.5 
billion). The other layers are funded by either reinsurance ($2 billion); policy- 
holder assessment ($1  billion), to cover a loan from the bond market; or Berk- 
shire Hathaway ($1.5 billion) (Roth 1998). 
4.1.3  Potential Role of the Capital Markets 
In the past few years, considerable interest has been shown by  investment 
banks and brokerage firms in developing new financial instruments for provid- 
ing protection against catastrophic risks (Jaffee and Russell 1996).  Their objec- 
tive is to find ways in which investors will be as comfortable trading new secur- 
itized instruments covering catastrophic exposures as they would the securities 
of any other asset class. In other words, catastrophe exposures would be treated 
as a new asset class. 
Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and Reynolds (1  996) have simulated ten thousand 
scenarios for a hypothetical ten-year catastrophe bond where the investor re- 
ceives a coupon of  14.57 percent (nine hundred basis points above Treasury 
bonds) over the life of the bond. If  the loss ratio exceeds 20 percent in any 
calendar year,  the bond expires, and the investor receives half the principal. 
The average rate of return for these bonds under these simulations was 7.47 
percent when random samples were taken from a lognormal distribution. This 
compares with an average return of 5.61 percent for a ten-year high-yield bond. 
Froot et al. (1995) computed the returns that an investor would have earned by 
providing capital to fund excess-of-loss  reinsurance contracts during the period 
1970-94. They found that an investor would have earned returns of 224 basis 
points above the Treasury bill rate during this entire period. In the best and 
worst years over this time horizon, the excess return would have been 7.5 per- 
cent and -22.1  percent, respectively. 
Until 1997, there has been relatively little interest by the investment commu- 
nity in these new instruments. But the picture appears to changing. Recently, 
USAA successfully floated a catastrophe bond that has two layers of debt: one 
layer is subject to interest forgiveness should USAA suffer a loss in excess of 155  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
$1 billion from a class 3, 4, or 5 hurricane; the other layer has both principal 
and interest at risk.3 The $400 million targeted capacity was oversubscribed, 
partly because investors are now more familiar with these types of instruments, 
but also because of the very high return on the investment. Another catastrophe 
bond based on California industry losses has been put together by Swiss Re, 
Credit Suisse, and First Boston for dealing with catastrophic earthquake losses 
(Doherty 1997). 
We feel that there are several reasons why the investment community has 
been slow to embrace these new capital market instruments. For one thing, the 
risks of catastrophic losses from natural disasters are highly uncertain, causing 
investors to focus on the high variance in losses. This concern has been height- 
ened by  the recent  projections  of  future losses  from hurricanes  and earth- 
quakes, which far exceed any disasters that have occurred until now.  In addi- 
tion, these are risks with which the investment community has no prior history 
or experience. Hence, there are currently no standards or ratings for evaluating 
the quality of a particular instrument. Finally, and perhaps most important, any 
innovation takes time to be adopted. There is generally a long process between 
the time a new product is introduced and the time there is a market for it, 
particularly if there are long-standing relationships between the two key inter- 
ested parties-insurers  and reinsurers (Wind 1982). 
4.2  Understanding Decision Processes of the Key Stakeholders 
In order to develop a strategy for managing catastrophic risks, one must 
characterize the nature of the hazards as well as understand the behavior of the 
interested parties concerned with the consequences of these events. The risks as- 
sociated with earthquakes and hurricanes fall into the class of low-probability, 
high-consequence (LP-HC) events. There is considerable ambiguity and un- 
certainty associated with predicting both the probability of  the event occurring 
at a specific time and place and the resulting losses to the affected community 
(Hanks and Cornell  1994). Experts often disagree on  these risk estimates. 
There is not sufficient evidence from past events or scientific models to recon- 
cile these differences. 
Hazard-risk maps have been drawn for both earthquakes and hurricanes, but 
they provide only rough guidelines as to the likelihood and potential dam- 
age from specific events. A case in point is the medium-intensity Northridge 
Earthquake, where the actual losses were considerably more than what was 
predicted by experts. Certain structures, notably steel-framed buildings with 
moment-resisting frames, failed even though they had been considered out- 
standingly good at handling earthquakes prior to Northridge (Valery 1995). 
3. The interest rate was 273 above LIBOR for the first layer of  debt and 576 for the more risky 
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4.2.1  Simplified Decision Rules 
The ambiguity associated with these events, coupled with the limited infor- 
mation-processing capabilities of individuals, has led potential disaster victims 
and insurers to utilize simplified decisiop rules that differ from such normative 
models of  choice as expected-utility theory or cost-benefit analysis (Camerer 
and Kunreuther 1989).  These choice processes need to be taken into account 
in designing strategies for managing catastrophic events. 
Residents in hazard-prone areas often exhibit one of two reactions with re- 
spect to LP-HC events. If they have not experienced the specific disaster and 
do not know friends and neighbors who have been in these events, then many 
believe that “it will not happen to me.” This perception of the risk is equivalent 
to treating the probability of the hurricane or earthquake as if  it were zero. 
These residents will have no interest in voluntarily purchasing insurance or in- 
vesting in mitigation measures (Kunreuther 1996). 
Individuals who have experienced a disaster or are concerned about the pos- 
sibility of  severe losses in the future because of  the media and/or personal 
knowledge are likely to purchase insurance voluntarily and/or invest in mitiga- 
tion measures. One factor that restrains propertyowners from incurring the up- 
front costs of loss-reduction measures is their unusually short time horizons. 
This may be due to the inability of people to project benefits over a long period 
of time and/or budget constraints that preclude large investments unless they 
pay off rapidly. For example, if it costs $1,000 to bolt a structure to its founda- 
tion and the expected annual reduction in losses is $300,4  then, even with an 
annual discount rate as high as 15 percent, the investment will pay off in five 
years.5 However, if  a homeowner compares the $1,000 investment with the 
one-year saving of $300, then he will not want to invest in this measure. 
Insurers are also concerned with ambiguity and uncertainty in determining 
whether  they  want to offer  coverage and, if  so, what  premiums  to charge 
against particular risks. For earthquakes and hurricanes, where the insurer is 
likely to have a portfolio of policies concentrated in one area, then the insurer 
will experience either feast (no hurricanes) or famine (a hurricane hitting the 
area where it has sold many policies). For such correlated risks, the insurer is 
concerned, not only with the uncertainty of the probability of a loss, but also 
with the magnitude of claims should a single disaster occur. 
In fact, a series of interviews conducted with insurers following Hurricane 
4. The expected annual loss is determined by multiplying the probabilities of disasters of differ- 
ent magnitudes by the resulting damage. For example, if the annual probability of an earthquake 
affecting one’s home was one in fifty and the savings in damage from bolting the house to the 
foundation  was  $15,000,  then  the expected annual  reduction  in  losses  is  $300 (ic. 1/50  X 
$15,000). assuming that this was the only earthquake that could damage the house. 
5. The expected benefit from the mitigation measure over a period of five years is z $300/(  1 + 
d)’, or $1,005, using an annual discount rate of d = 15 percent. 157  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake indicated that a key factor influencing 
their decision-making process regarding how  many  policies to write is their 
probable maximum loss (PML) should a catastrophic disaster occur.6  In many 
hazard-prone regions, a number of insurers would like to reduce their current 
PMLs, in part because the A. M. Best Company has begun to include PML ex- 
posures as a part of  its rating of insurer capability (“Catastrophes” 1996). 
One of the questions that every insurer asks is whether earthquake risks are 
insurable. In  his definitive study, which sheds light on this question, Stone 
(1973) indicated that firms are interested in maximizing expected profits sub- 
ject to two constraints, representing the survival of the firm and the stability of 
its operation. The insurance underwriter operationalizes the survival constraint 
by choosing a portfolio of risks so that the estimated probability of insolvency 
is less than p,.  The stability constraint focuses on the combined loss and ex- 
pense ratio (LR) for each year. Insurers define a target level (LR*) that repre- 
sents an upper limit on this ratio and requires the probability that LR exceed 
LR*) to be less than p,.’ 
A simple example illustrates how these two constraints would be utilized by 
an insurer in determining whether the earthquake risk is insurable. All houses 
in the earthquake area are assumed to be identical, and the insurance premium 
on each structure is therefore set at P. Suppose that the Shaker Insurance Com- 
pany had A dollars in current surplus and wanted to determine the number of 
policies it would be able to sell and still satisfy the above two constraints. The 
maximum number of policies (n,)  that would satisfy the survival constraint is 
determined by 
probability[(total losses  > n,P +  A)]  <  pi. 
The maximum number of policies (n,) satisfying the stability constraint is de- 
termined by 
probability[(total losses +  expenses)/n,P  > LR*] < p,. 
Whether the Shaker Company will view the earthquake risk as insurable 
depends on whether the fixed cost of developing the product is sufficiently low 
that it can make a positive expected profit. This in turn depends on how large 
the values of n, and n2 are for any given premium P.  Note that Shaker also has 
the freedom to change its premium. A larger P for any prespecified loss struc- 
ture will increase the values of n, and n, but will lower the demand for cover- 
age. Shaker will decide not to offer earthquake coverage if  it believes that it 
6. These interviews were conducted by Jacqueline Meszaros as part of a National Science Foun- 
dation study (see Meszaros 1997). 
7. In their analysis of  insurance pricing of catastrophic risks, Dong, Shah, and Wong (1996) 
modify the stability constraint by  formulating it as the probability that  LR exceeds LR* by  x 
percentage points (e.g., 4 percent) is less than p2. 158  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
cannot attract enough demand at any premium structure to make a positive 
expected profit using the survival and/or stability constraints as restrictions on 
how many policies it is willing to offer. 
The decision rules utilized by insurers in setting premiums for coverage are 
a function of how ambiguous and correlated the risks are. Studies of actuaries 
and underwriters of primary insurers and reinsurers reveal that both these fac- 
tors play a key role in their premium-setting decisions. A survey of 463 actuar- 
ies concerning a defective-product scenario where the probability of loss was 
varied and there was a perfectly correlated risk revealed that the median pre- 
mium that they would charge was anywhere from two to ten times larger if the 
probability was  ambiguous than if  it was well specified (Hogarth and Kun- 
reuther  1992). In another survey, when underwriters in primary and reinsur- 
ance companies were given scenarios of an earthquake risk with well-specified 
probabilities and losses as well as scenarios where the risk was  ambiguous 
and uncertain, the responses were similar to those of the actuaries. The mean 
premium was 50 percent higher for primary underwriters and 40 percent higher 
for reinsurer underwriters for the case where the probability of a loss was am- 
biguous and the magnitude of the loss was uncertain than when the risk was 
well specified (Kunreuther et al. 1993). 
4.2.2  Nested Decision Structures 
Another feature of the choice process that needs to be taken into account 
when developing strategies is the interconnectedness between the different 
policy instruments and the stakeholders associated with the management of 
catastrophic risks. To illustrate how policy instruments are nested, consider the 
relation between mitigation and insurance. If  building codes are enforced for 
all structures in hazard-prone areas, future disaster losses are likely to be re- 
duced significantly.  This will have several desirable effects. First, it will reduce 
the magnitude of the losses from future disasters and hence enable insurers to 
provide additional coverage to propertyowners. This will decrease the need for 
reinsurance and for funds from other sources, such as the capital market and 
state pools. If  rates are based on risk, it will also enable insurers to offer prop- 
ertyowners coverage at lower premiums for the same amount of coverage. 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), created by Congress in 1968 
in response to mounting flood losses and increasing costs to the general taxpay- 
ers through disaster relief, illustrates the interaction of a set of policy tools for 
dealing with this hazard. To encourage communities to participate in the pro- 
gram, and to maintain the property values of  structures, those residing in the 
area prior to the issuance of a flood-insurance rate map had their premiums 
subsidized. New  construction was  charged an  actuarial premium reflecting 
the risks of flood (Interagency Flood Plain Management Review Committee 
1  994). 
To prevent development of  structures in highly hazard-prone areas, com- 
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stricting the construction of  houses in high-hazard areas or if  residents are 
required to meet standards according to which they are protected against floods 
with an annual probability of one in one hundred or greater. As a condition for 
receiving grants or loans for the acquisition, construction, or improvement of 
structures located in the one-hundred-year floodplain, the propertyowner must 
purchase flood insurance. However, evidence from a U.S. General Accounting 
Office study indicates that this requirement has not been routinely enforced. A 
survey in Texas following a major flood in  1989 revealed that 79 percent of 
the damaged properties that had been required to purchase flood coverage were 
uninsured at the time of the disaster (U.S. General Accounting Office 1990).8 
Turning to the stakeholders, the decision processes of one interested party 
will affect the behavior of another group, which will influence the choices of 
a third party, etc. A change in a given policy or program must be carefully 
structured to reflect this nested decision structure (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, 
and  Schoemaker 1993). The  challenges associated with  reducing disaster 
losses through mitigation measures illustrate this point. There is considerable 
empirical evidence that relatively few homeowners adopt loss-reduction mea- 
sures even if  they are relatively inexpensive and promise to yield sufficient 
benefits to justify the cost (Palm 1995). One solution to this problem is to in- 
form individuals of the dangers of living in specific areas and to develop build- 
ing codes that are well enforced. 
Other stakeholders have good financial reasons not to implement these mea- 
sures. Real estate agents have  no reason to provide prospective buyers with 
information on the hazards associated with living in a particular structure that 
does not meet the building code. They are supported implicitly by the current 
ownel; who wants to sell his property at as high a price as possible. Further- 
more the potential buyer may have little interest in knowing about the design 
of the structure if he does not think about the risks associated with future di- 
sasters. 
The problem is compounded by  developers and contractors, who want to 
build structures as cheaply as possible so that they can sell them more easily 
and remain competitive. Until recently, insurers and reinsurers have generally 
not been sensitive to the design of structures when they issue coverage against 
wind or earthquake damage. Hence, inspections are not required as a condition 
for insurance. In setting premiums for structures in hazard-prone areas, insur- 
ers do not know whether specific mitigation measures have been put in place. 
To the extent that local and state governments do not enforce codes through 
inspections of individual structures? this represents a type of  ex ante moral 
hazard. 
One might expect banks and financial  institutions to be  sensitive to the 
8. More details on proposals for linking alternative policy instruments for dealing with the flood 
hazard can be found in the Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee (1994) report. 
9. For a more detailed discussion of ex ante moral hazard, see Pauly (1974). Marshall (1976), 
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structural design of the property when issuing a mortgage, but they generally 
do not require any certification that the property meets current building codes. 
In informal discussions, one hears the comment that a bank cannot remain 
competitive if it is the only one demanding that the property be inspected. One 
can also speculate that managers  employed by  financial institutions do not 
worry about the possibility of a future disaster or are convinced that victims 
will receive sufficient disaster assistance to maintain their mortgage payments. 
In addition, most banks send their mortgages to the secondary market, where 
the  new  lending  institution  may  have  limited  knowledge  of  the hazard  in 
question. 
The upshot of this set of dynamics is that many homes are likely to be con- 
structed in such a way that they do not meet code. Insurance experts have indi- 
cated that 25 percent of the insured losses from Hurricane Andrew could have 
bew  prevented through better building-code compliance and enforcement (In- 
surance  Information  Institute  1995). One  question  that  naturally  arises  is 
whether insurers working closely with financial institutions and public-sector 
agencies  can  encourage  propertyowners  to  adopt  cost-effective  mitigation 
measures by offering premium reductions for safer houses and requiring that 
homes be inspected before a policy is issued. The effect of such a strategy 
could significantly reduce future losses from natural disasters. 
4.2.3  Summary 
Given the nature of the decision processes and the degree of nestedness be- 
tween the different stakeholders, there may be new roles for the private market 
and the public sector to play in helping manage the problems of catastrophic 
risk. For example, if individuals are reluctant to incur up-front costs of mitiga- 
tion measures that promise to be cost effective in the long run, there is an 
opportunity for insurers and banks to join forces to alleviate this concern. One 
way  to do this is for the insurer to lower premiums, reflecting the expected 
reduction in future losses, and for banks to provide the propertyowner with a 
low-interest loan over the life of  the mortgage for financing mitigation ex- 
penses. It is very likely that the annual loan payments will be less than the 
premium reduction, thus guaranteeing that every knowledgeable homeowner 
will want to adopt cost-effective mitigation measures. 
Different stakeholders can also join forces in promoting new financial in- 
struments  to  supplement  reinsurance  for protecting  insurers  against  cata- 
strophic losses. Here, the challenge is to convince investors that their chances 
of  suffering large losses are relatively small compared to the expected return 
on their investment. This process is not an easy one, particularly if the invest- 
ment community is unfamiliar with the types of risks against which they would 
be  providing  protection.  The ambiguity  associated  with  estimating  future 
losses and the conflicts between experts on their assumptions for developing 
catastrophe models leave investors somewhat confused about what they are 
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financial instruments. As we will indicate in the next section, there are opportu- 
nities for examining expert differences in a systematic manner. Such analyses 
may alleviate some of the concerns of potential investors. 
4.3  A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Alternative Programs 
4.3.1  New Advances in Risk Assessment, Information Technology, 
and Catastrophe Modeling 
There is now an opportunity to evaluate alternative strategies for managing 
the risks from natural disasters by taking advantage of a set of new develop- 
ments in the areas of risk assessment (RA), information technology (IT), and 
catastrophe modeling (CM). Turning first to RA, by merging information de- 
rived from past records of earthquakes and humcanes with an increased under- 
standing of the characteristics of these hazards, scientists have been able to 
reduce our uncertainty about forecasting future events. With respect to damage 
estimation, engineers can now better characterize the performance of different 
types of structures during hurricanes of different wind speeds and earthquakes 
of different magnitudes and intensities.I0 
On the IT side, the development of faster and more powerful computers en- 
ables us to examine extremely complex phenomena in ways that were impos- 
sible even five years ago. Large databases can easily be stored and manipulated 
so that large-scale simulations of different disaster scenarios under alternative 
policy alternatives can now be undertaken. 
Finally, new advances in CM provide an opportunity to combine scientific 
risk assessments with historical records to estimate the probabilities of disas- 
ters of different magnitudes and the resulting damage to the affected region. A 
catastrophe model is the set of databases and computer programs designed to 
analyze the effect of different scenarios on hazard-prone areas. The informa- 
tion can be presented in the form of expected annual losses based on simula- 
tions run over a long period  of time (e.g., ten thousand years) or the effect 
of  specijc events (e.g., worst-case  scenarios). Several firms have developed 
catastrophe models and provide detailed analyses of their databases to the vari- 
ous parties concerned with these risks (e.g., insurers, reinsurers, government 
agencies, and disaster-prone communities). 
4.3.2  Nature of Modules 
These new advances in RA, IT, and CM provide the impetus for constructing 
a framework for examining alternative approaches to managing catastrophic 
risks. Below, we describe the different modules that are depicted graphically 
in figure 4.2. 
10. For a more detailed discussion of  new advances in seismology and earthquake engineering, 
see FEMA (1994) and Office of Technology Assessment (1995). 162  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
PrivaieIPublic-Sector Initiatives 
and Strategies 
Fig. 4.2  Framework for analyzing catastrophic risks 
One must first characterize the population and property at risk. For the natu- 
ral hazards problem, this involves constructing a community or region con- 
sisting of homes, businesses, and other properties that are subject to future 
disasters. More specifically, we  want to know the design of  each structure, 
whether specific mitigation measures are in place or could be utilized, the pre- 
cise location of the structure in relation to the hazard (e.g., distance from an 
earthquake fault line or proximity to the coast in a hurricane-prone area), and 
other risk-related factors. 
The second module consists of the elements that characterize the nature of 
the risk,  namely, the probability that disasters of specific magnitudes will occur 
and the resulting losses to structures in harm’s way. These first two modules 
provide the ingredients for a module labeled potential damage to property at 
risk, which characterizes the potential damage to individual structures and the 
model cities from a specific type of hazard. 
The propertyowner decisions module consists of a set of  decision rules uti- 
lized by propertyowners in making choices regarding the purchase of insurance 
and the adoption of loss-prevention measures. The module will build on our 
understanding of the decision processes of individuals with respect to LP-HC 163  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
events. For example, if  homeowners  consider purchasing  insurance only if 
they perceive the probability of the event to be greater than some critical value 
p*), then one must incorporate risk perceptions as part of the decision-process 
module and determine how these perceptions are formed. In addition, one will 
need information on residents’ and businesses’  income and assets, their atti- 
tudes toward risk,  and their expectations of public  subsidies and assistance 
following a disaster. 
The insurer/reinsurer decisions module characterizes the decision processes 
utilized by insurers and reinsurers in underwriting residential and commercial 
property by building on recent empirical studies of the decision processes of 
underwriters, actuaries, and other insurance executives. In particular, there is a 
need to understand the factors that encourage or inhibit the insurance industry 
from providing  coverage against losses due to hurricanes, earthquakes, and 
other natural disasters. 
A  module  characterizing  a  representative  catastrophic  insurance market 
will be developed consisting of propertyowners, prototypical insurance com- 
panies (e.g., small, medium, large), and reinsurers. Books of business for each 
company will be generated under various assumptions about the supply of and 
demand for insurance and alternative regulatory policies and risk-management 
strategies of insurers and reinsurers. 
By constructing large, medium, and small representative insurers with spe- 
cific balance sheets, types of insurance portfolios, premium structures, and a 
wide range of potential financial instruments, one could examine the effect of 
different disasters on the  insurer’s profitability,  solvency, and performance. 
Such analyses may also enable one to price the costs of different types of  fi- 
nancial instruments on the basis of simulated loss experience over time. This 
information  could be translated into prices of  these financial instruments re- 
flecting both the expected loss and the variance in these estimates. One could 
also examine the role of the public sector in regulating rates and providing 
protection against catastrophic losses. 
Finally, the private/public-sector  initiatives and strategies module will eval- 
uate alternative programs and institutional arrangements between the private 
and the public sectors. These strategies, which range from information, incen- 
tives, and insurance to building codes and land-use regulations, will be impor- 
tant inputs to the modules characterizing propertyowner and insurer/reinsurer 
decisions. For example, if banks and financial institutions require certain miti- 
gation measures as a condition for a mortgage, this has implications for the 
way in which propertyowners make decisions and also affects insurer/reinsurer 
decision processes. 
In examining these measures, one must consider the agendas and decision 
processes of the concerned interested parties in the private and public sectors. 
What values and agendas do these stakeholders bring to the table? How do 
they interact with each other? What programs and policies do they favor for 
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The analyses of these issues often involve questions of equity and efficiency. 
Who should pay for the costs of natural disasters? What is the appropriate level 
and nature of regulatory oversight of catastrophe-insurance markets? Are other 
regulatory measures needed to encourage mitigation and prefinancing? Should 
we restrict individuals from residing in hazard-prone areas or require them to 
adopt mitigation measures? How do we deal with low-income families who 
cannot afford the costs of insurance and prevention measures? These and other 
related questions need to be addressed in developing a strategy for managing 
catastrophic risks. 
4.4  Prototype Analysis Using the Conceptual Framework 
To provide insight into the interaction of policy instruments and outcomes, 
we have constructed a “model city” in California that is subject to possible 
damage from earthquakes.  Four  prototypical  insurance  companies  provide 
coverage to the propertyowners in the city. In this community, we assume that 
all residents and businesses would like to purchase earthquake insurance but 
that not all of them can obtain coverage. If the insurer is concerned with the 
possibility of insolvency, it will limit the amount of coverage that it provides, 
and some propertyowners will be unprotected. For this analysis, we are assum- 
ing that the insurer will determine how much coverage it offers by focusing on 
a survival constraint similar to the one characterizing insurers’ behavior in sec- 
tion 4.2 above. 
Two policy options will be examined in this analysis: the availability of rein- 
surance for and effect of reinsurance on primary underwriters and the adoption 
of mitigation measures by propertyowners. The amount and pricing of avail- 
able reinsurance are, of course, likely to be the result of complex market and 
regulatory interactions that are not explored explicitly here. Our interest is in 
understanding the aggregate effect of reinsurance on expected and worst-case 
results for various classes of propertyowners in the model city and for insur- 
ance companies operating there. Similar comments apply for mitigation in that 
we do not study the pricing, the detailed decision processes, or the regulatory 
requirements associated with mitigation, only the aggregate effects of several 
exogenously imposed scenarios for mitigation adoption. More detailed models 
for both reinsurance and mitigation are the subjects of ongoing research using 
the model city framework introduced here. 
4.4.1  General Model Structure 
The structure of  the prototype analysis is shown in figure 4.3. First, the 
structure of the model city is specified. Then scenario variables are set. These 
variables, together with a model characterizing the earthquake hazard (i.e., the 
RWP model described below), give rise to a loss distribution, F(L) = Pr(1oss 
5  L}, and  the  associated  exceedance  probability  (EP)  function, EP(L)  = 
Pr(1oss >  L} = 1 -  F(L).  For a given insurance company, the EP function is, 165  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
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Fig. 4.3  General structure of the model 
of course, a function of the number and type of properties insured, mitigation 
levels, coverage limits, amount of reinsurance, and events (location, number, 
and seventy of earthquakes) that are used to generate loss exposures. The EP 
functions for all insurance companies and for uninsured properties provide the 
foundation for evaluating expected and worst-case consequences of  the as- 
sumed scenario. The structure of the model is depicted in figure 4.3. Let us 
consider each of its elements in more detail. 
4.4.2  Construction of Model City 
The model city is a virtual mirror of Oakland, California, in terms of num- 
ber, types, and mix of structures. As noted above, the insurance market consists 
of four hypothetical companies: company LG (large), company M (medium), 
company S (small), and company 0  (other or none of the above). All properties 
are initially assigned to precisely one of these companies, on a random basis, 
but matching some prespecified criteria for the book of business in question. 
Hence, the books of business of companies LG, M, S, and 0  cover every prop- 
erty in the city. 
One may think of these initially assigned books of business as the maximum 166  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
Table 4.2  Composition of Books of Business by ATC Classification 
Model 
Small  Medium  Large  Other  City 
Wood frame 
Light metal 
Unreinforced masonry wall 
Reinforced concrete (RC) shear wall 
RC shear wall without frame 
Reinforced masonry shear wall 
Reinforced masonry shear wall with 
Braced steel frame 
Moment steel frame (perimeter) 
Moment steel frame (distributed) 
Ductile RC frame (distributed) 
Nonductile RC frame (distributed) 
Precast concrete (non-tilt-up) 
Precast concrete (tilt-up) 














































































(or full-coverage) book of business that each of the four companies can write 
in the city. As we will note below, however, companies may cover only a frac- 
tion of  their “full-coverage’’ book of  business, depending on the amount of 
coverage they wish to offer in the city. Let P(x) = the probability that a struc- 
ture will be assigned to company x. To  construct the initial or full-coverage 
books of business, each structure of the model city was randomly assigned to 
a specific book of business according to the following rules: (a)  If the structure 
is classified as commercial, it is assigned as follows: P(LG) = SO, P(M) = 
.lo,  P(S) = .02, and P(0)  = .38. (b)  If the structure is classified as industrial, 
it is assigned as follows: P(LG) = .20, P(M) = .lo, P(S) = .OO,  and P(0)  = 
.70. (c) If the structure is classified as residential, it is assigned as follows: 
P(LG) = .OO,  P(M) = .lo, P(S) = .05, and P(0) = .85. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
provide information on the specification of the model city and of the insurance 
companies’ initial books of business (by ATC  [Applied Technology Council] 
class and occupancy type). 
Levels ufMitigation.  Alternative types and levels of mitigation are assumed as 
part of  the model scenario. The level of mitigation can vary from 0 to  100 
percent of applicable structures for each type of mitigation. We will be exam- 
ining three levels in our analysis: 0, 50, and 100 percent. Full (100 percent) 
mitigation assumes that every structure in the model city is rehabilitated to the 
level of  the current code, with lower levels of  mitigation (e.g., 50 percent) 
having costs proportional to the full mitigation costs (e.g., 50 percent of these 
full costs). For older structures, rehabilitation can be quite expensive. For those 167  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
Table 4.3  Composition of Books of Business by Occupancy Qpe 
Model 
Small  Medium  Large  Other  City 
Permanent dwelling: family housing  3,149  6,383  376  54,259  64,167 
Retail trade  33  78  187  539  837 
Professional, technical, and business 
services  5  20  80  76  181 
Entertainment and recreation  1  6  34  43  84 
Unspecified  1,417  3,335  2,827  24,998  32,577 
Total number of structures  4,605  9,822  3,504  79,915  97,846 
already at current code, no further expense is required. Mitigation costs are 
based on those of  a sample of rehabilitated  structures (of the various types 
outlined in tables 4.2 and 4.3) in Los Angeles, which are then revised to take 
account of construction methods, materials, labor, and building-permit fees in 
other locales." 
Availability and Type of  Reinsurance. We assume that excess-loss reinsurance 
is available that requires the primary insurer to retain a specified level of risk 
and covers all losses between the attachment points of the reinsurance policy. 
Thus, reinsurance policies are of  the following form: the reinsurer pays all 
losses in the interval Lo to L,, where L, -  Lo is restricted  to be no greater 
than some maximum reinsurance coverage.I2  As explained in more detail in 
appendix A, we assume that each insurance company is required to retain a 
certain percentage of its risk, where the retention level is defined as a percent- 
age of worst-case losses. 
Insurance and Reinsurance Premium Levels. We assume that full earthquake 
coverage is available, with a prespecified deductible, at a rate proportional to 
the expected loss of the property covered. The same premium structure is as- 
sumed for reinsurance rates, that is, proportional to the expected loss associ- 
ated with the reinsurance contract in question. The proportionality or loading 
factors for primary coverage and for reinsurance may be different, of course. 
4.4.3  The RWP Model and EP Functions 
In appendix B, we describe the structure of the RWP software that was used 
to obtain probabilistic damage estimates from earthquakes of different magni- 
11, These figures were provided to us by Risk Management Solutions. We will use the midpoint 
(or average) of  the sample estimates of mitigation costs in our analysis. Low estimates (corre- 
sponding to the ,1666 fractile of the sample distribution) of mitigation costs run about 25 percent 
of  the midpoint values, and  high estimates (corresponding to  the 3333 fractile of  the sample 
distribution) of mitigation costs run about double the midpoint values. 
12. For additional details on the structure of reinsurance policies, see app. A. 168  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
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tudes and intensity for structures in the model city. Essentially, the probability 
distribution of  losses (and the associated EP function) for any given book of 
business is determined by simulating the effects of the set of earthquake events 
that could effect the model city over a specified interval of time, a single year 
for our analysis. Such events are differentiated by  location, magnitude, and 
type of earthquake. The losses from the assumed set of earthquake events can 
then be stochastically summed to obtain a histogram and cumulative distribu- 
tion of losses arising from these events, together with the associated EP func- 
tion. These loss distributions can be derived for any specific set of properties 
and, in particular, for the books of business of the prototypical insurance com- 
panies of interest to us in the model city. Note that a separate model run is re- 
quired whenever the characteristics (e.g., mitigation levels or building type) of 
the properties underlying the EP function are changed. 
4.4.4  Evaluation 
The evaluation phase considers the total expected and worst-case losses for 
each stakeholder group, where worst-case losses are computed for an EP value 
of  .01,  with the result that worst case here means that the probability of  ex- 
ceeding these losses is .01. Of course, insurers and reinsurers may use “target 
ruin probabilities” that are considerably smaller than .01 in computing needed 
reserves and coverage limits. For insured propertyowners, losses include ex- 
penses prior to a disaster (premiums and mitigation costs) as well as repair 
costs that they must incur personally (i.e., deductibles on their insurance pol- 
icy). The losses of uninsured propertyowners consist of mitigation costs plus 
repair costs. For society as a whole, total losses include the cost of mitigation 
plus total property losses from the disaster as well as any transactions costs 
resulting from insolvencies and their consequences. 
The base-case parameters for the analyses that follow are given in table 4.4. 
Note that we have varied the asset levels of the small, medium, and large com- 169  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
Table 4.5  The Effect of Mitigation Level on Expected and Worst-case 
Losses ($millions) 
Mitigation Level 
0%  50%  100% 
Small-pool losses: 
Expected losses 
Total worst-case loss 




Total worst-case loss 




Total worst-case loss 




Total worst-case loss 
Insurer’s worst-case loss 
Mitigation costs 
Model city losses: 
Expected losses 
Total worst-case loss 






























































panies. Premiums are determined by  calculating the expected annual losses 
from earthquakes and adding a loading factor of 100 percent. If reinsurance is 
available to companies, the maximum amount varies depending on the size of 
the insurer. The lower attachment point is determined for each company by 
requiring that the company be able to take on 10 percent of the losses from a 
worst-case event for the company’s insured book of business. 
To begin, let us consider the effect of the level of mitigation on total losses. 
These results are shown in table 4.5 for the full book of business for each of 
our four insurance companies and for levels of  mitigation of 0, 50, and 100 
percent;  where  100 percent means that all model city properties  have been 
rehabilitated to current code for each structural type. To make mitigation costs 
comparable with insurance costs and losses (all of which are annual), we annu- 
itize total mitigation costs, using an interest rate of 10 percent.I3 Note in partic- 
13. Thus, for the small company pool, which consists of  4,605 structures of  various types, the 
(typical or midpoint) total mitigation cost to bring these all to current code was $137.5 million. 
With a discount rate of  10 percent, this leads to an annuity of  $13.8 million, as shown in table 170  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
ular that we do not check each structure to determine whether particular miti- 
gation measures are cost effective. Rather, the analysis assumes that structures 
in a particular class adopt mitigation  measures appropriate to that class on a 
random basis, with the percentage of adoption (0-100  percent) being specified 
in the scenario. A structure-by-structure cost-effectiveness approach would, of 
course, yield significantly lower total costs than our one-size-fits-all approach. 
In table 4.5, we have tabulated the expected and worst-case losses for the 
four respective insurance pools (the first two entries under each heading) and 
for the entire model city. We have also listed the insurer’s worst-case loss. This 
is different from the total worst-case loss since we assume as our base case 
(see table 4.4) that there is a 10 percent deductible on each policy. The conse- 
quence of this is that total  worst-case  losses will contain both  the insurer’s 
worst-case loss as well as the first risk layer, deductible losses, assumed by the 
propertyowners. Thus, the difference between the second and the third entries 
under each heading (total worst-case loss minus insurer’s worst-case loss) rep- 
resents worst-case deductible losses for the respective full insurer pool (actual 
worst-case deductible losses will be less if the insurer does not offer coverage 
to the whole pool). 
We  see from table 4.5 that, as the level of  mitigation  increases, both  ex- 
pected and worst-case losses decrease. Note that the expected losses and the 
worst-case  losses tabulated here are simply the total losses in the indicated 
insurance pool (small, medium, large, or other) and do not include mitigation 
costs, which are tabulated separately in table 4.5. 
Neglecting the costs of insolvencies, we see that, for this scenario, total so- 
cial cost (the sum of gross costs plus mitigation costs) increases in expected- 
value  terms  as mitigation  increases  but  decreases  significantly  in  terms  of 
worst-case losses. This suggests that purely random prioritization of mitigation 
or total rehabilitation will not be effective in expected-value terms. However, 
even random prioritization  may have significant benefits in avoiding insolven- 
cies and in reducing worst-case losses. Put differently, assuming the usual con- 
vex shape of mitigation cost effectiveness, these initial results suggest that the 
social optimum will require less than 100 percent mitigation and some prioriti- 
zation of mitigation targets to assure cost effectiveness. Other aspects of reduc- 
ing the tail losses through mitigation will be discussed below. 
Let us now examine in a bit more detail the consequences of mitigation for 
companies LG, M, and S, with and without reinsurance available. The results 
for these cases are given in tables 4.6-4.8.  Each of these tables analyzes one 
of the companies LG, M, and S under three mitigation levels assumed (0,50, 
and 100 percent) and under two reinsurance scenarios (no reinsurance and re- 
insurance levels as specified in table 4.4 above). (Note that the prefix E means 
~ 
4.5. This annuitization will be a good approximation to annual costs if the structure and the mitiga- 
tion undertaken enjoy a long life into the future. Shorter lives of the property or the mitigation or 
higher discount rates would imply higher effective annual mitigation costs. 171  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
Table 4.6  Small Company Case ($millions) 
Mitigation Level 
0%  50%  100% 
No  No  No 




E-cost of claims 
Worst-case loss for S 




Cost of mitigation 
E-deductible loss for insured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to insured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to all propertyowners 
WC-deductible loss for 
insured propertyowners 
WC-cost to insured 
propertyowners 
WC-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners 































































































Note: N.A. = not applicable. 
“expected”-e.g.,  E-cost of  claims is the expected cost of  claims for those 
who are insured-and  that the prefix WC-means “worst case.”) As the results 
are similar for each company, we focus in table 4.7 on company M results (see 
tables 4.2 and 4.3 above for the book of business that M covers). In table 4.9, 
we also provide “per capita figures” corresponding to company M. These were 
obtained by  noting from table 4.2 that there are a total of  9,822 properties 
insured in M’s total pool. Since at each level of coverage we are assuming that 
a random portfolio of  these properties is chosen, we can provide per capita 
results simply by  dividing the respective quantities (e.g., expected losses) by 
the fraction of the 9,822 properties involved in generating the quantity in ques- 
tion (e.g., dividing by  the number of  properties represented in the aggregate 
expected-loss  figure). For example, consider the E-cost of claims with no rein- 
surance and 50 percent mitigation. The total expected losses for this are shown 172  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
Table 4.7  Medium Company Case ($millions) 
Mitigation Level 
0%  50%  100% 
No  No  No 




E-cost of claims 
Worst-case loss for M 




Cost of mitigation 
E-deductible loss for insured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to insured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to all propertyowners 
WC-deductible loss for 
insured propertyowners 
WC-cost to insured 
propertyowners 
WC-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners 































































































Note:  N.A. = not applicable. 
as $6.7 million in table 4.7 (row 3). The percentage of full coverage offered 
under the no-reinsurance, 50 percent mitigation scenario is (see row 1 of table 
4.7) 38.1 percent, or 3,742 of the 9,822 properties at risk. Hence, the per capita 
figure for E-cost of  claims is $6.7 million/3,742 = $1,790, as shown in table 
4.9 (row 3). 
Now consider the results under each heading in tables 4.7 and 4.9. 
Percentage Insured. As the level of mitigation increases, the EP function shifts 
downward. Thus, company M, which is assumed to operate under a PML rule, 
is able to expand its coverage while still keeping within its target ruin probabil- 
ity. Similarly, with increased availability of reinsurance, company M can ex- 
pand its coverage (even though M is paying a reinsurance premium of  150 
percent times the expected value of the losses covered by the reinsurance). 173  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
Table 4.8  Large Company Case ($millions) 
Mitigation Level 
0%  50%  100% 
No  No  No 
Reins  Reins  Reins  Reins  Reins  Reins 
Insurance outcomes: 
% insured  38.1  56.3  44.3 
Insurance premiums  34.5  51.0  32.1 
E-cost of claims  17.3  19.8  16.0 
Worst-case loss for LG  434.2  641.7  432.8 
Limits (Lo  and L,)  of  N.A.  64.2  N.A. 
Reinsurance premiums  N.A.  9.4  N.A. 
Cost of mitigation  .o  .O  30.2 
E-deductible loss for insured 
propertyowners  33.7  49.7  35.0 
E-cost to insured 
propertyowners  68.2  100.7  80.5 
E-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners  82.7  58.4  81.1 
E-cost to all propertyowners  150.9  159.1  161.6 
WC-deductible loss for 
insured propertyowners  156.4  230.9  170.4 
WC-cost to insured 
propertyowners  191.0  281.9  215.9 
WC-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners  958.9  677.4  774.2 
WC-cost to all propertyowners  1,149.9  959.3  990.1 



















52.6  78.1 
29.4  43.7 
14.7  18.1 
429.3  637.5 
N.A.  63.7 
263.7 
N.A.  6.2 
60.5  60.5 
36.4  54.1 
97.6  145.1 
74.7  34.5 
172.4  179.6 
188.5  279.9 
249.7  370.9 
585.4  270.5 
835.2  641.3 
~~ 
Note; N.A. = not applicable. 
Insurance Premiums and Expected Cost of  Claims. As the level of mitigation 
increases,  both premium  income and the expected cost  of  claims decline. 
These reductions occur in spite of the fact that M is offering greater coverage 
in the model city. Clearly, the lower losses due to mitigation more than com- 
pensate for the risks of increased coverage. 
Worst-Case Loss  for M.  This is the worst-case loss for insurer M for its full 
book of business times the percentage of that book (see row 1 of table 4.7) that 
M insures. Per capita figures simply divide this loss by the number of insured 
properties. Let us illustrate the links between various quantities in tables 4.5 
and 4.7. We do this for the case of 0 percent mitigation and no reinsurance, 
where the worst-case loss for the entire medium pool (see table 4.5) is 912.3. 
And this sum contains deductible losses of 257.5, leaving M with a worst-case 174  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
Table 4.9  Medium Company Case Per Capita Outcomes ($) 
0%  50%  100% 
No  No  No 
Reins  Reins  Reins  Reins  Reins  Reins 




E-cost of  claims 
Worst-case loss for M 
Reinsurance premiums 
owners: 
Cost of  mitigation per 
structure 
E-deductible loss for insured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to insured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners 
E-cost to all propertyowners 
Worst-case outcomes for property- 
owners: 
WC-deductible loss for 
insured propertyowners 
WC-cost to insured 
property  owners 
WC-cost to uninsured 
propertyowners 
WC-cost to all propertyowners 
Expected outcomes for property- 
3,212  4,675 
4,390  4,406 
2,211  1,069 
66,661  66,670 
N.A.  1,904 
0  0 
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insured loss of 912.3 -  257.5 = 654.8 (again shown in table 4.5) under the 
assumption that M insures the entire medium pool. But, as we see from row  1 
of table 4.7, M insures only 32.7 percent of this full book of business, leading 
to a worst-case loss for M’s  actual book of business of .327 X 654.8 = 214.1 
and a worst-case deductible loss of .327 X 257.5 = 84.2, as shown in table 4.7. 
Reinsurance Premiums and Limits. Reinsurance premiums also decline as the 
level of mitigation increases, owing to the downward shifting of the EP func- 
tion. Note that we have assumed that maximum reinsurance coverage is not 
reduced as mitigation is increased (and expected losses are reduced). Note that 
the reinsurance limit of $100 million is always attained, a result of the fact that 
M is insuring less than its full book of business (and would prefer to insure 
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Cost of Mitigation. The cost of mitigation naturally increases as the level of 
mitigation increases. Note that the cost figure given here is the total cost for 
the entire initial book of  M’s business, only a fraction of which (see the first 
row of table 4.7) is actually insured. 
Deductible Losses (either Expected or Worst Case)  for Insureds of  M. As the 
level of mitigation increases and the level of insurance coverage offered in- 
creases, so will deductible losses (the first risk layer) arising from this ex- 
panded coverage (see table 4.7). Reinsurance will further increase coverage 
and therefore increase deductible losses for insureds. 
Cost to Insured Propertyowners (either Expected or Worst Case). Neglecting 
any costs of insolvency, the cost to insured propertyowners is their deductible 
loss plus their premium plus mitigation costs. These expected costs increase, 
and the worst case costs decline, as the level of mitigation increases. This is 
the result of the random prioritization of mitigation; that is, mitigation has not 
been applied here in a cost-effective manner for the structures in this book of 
business. Availability of reinsurance expands coverage dramatically and causes 
total expected costs to all insured propertyowners to increase. The reader may 
note from table 4.9 that on a per capita basis total expected costs increase with 
the availability of reinsurance. 
Costs to Uninsured Propertyowners (either  Expected or Worst Case). The cost 
to uninsured propertyowners is just the sum of their mitigation cost plus their 
losses. For example, in the case with 50 percent mitigation and no reinsurance, 
we see from table 4.5 that the E-cost of medium-pool losses is 58.0 and that 
mitigation costs are 16.3. We  can determine from row 1 of table 4.7 that the 
percentage of uninsured propertyowners in M’s pool is 100 -  38.1 percent = 
61.9 percent. Thus, the E-cost to uninsured propertyowners is .619 X  16.3 + 
.619 X 58.0 = 46.0, as shown in table 4.7. 
Costs to All Property Owners (either Expected or Worst Case).  This is just the 
sum of all costs to insured and uninsured propertyowners  in company M’s pool. 
For this pool, expected costs are minimized at no mitigation and no reinsur- 
ance, while the opposite is true of worst-case costs. The key here is that ex- 
pected costs increase as insurance coverage increases since there is a signif- 
icant  loading factor on  expected losses to  obtain premiums  charged. The 
optimal mitigation and reinsurance level for social welfare will, of course, de- 
pend on the degree of risk aversion of propertyowners. 
While we have discussed only company M in detail, the results for the other 
companies and for the total losses and the overall portfolio of insurance offered 
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the effects of  mitigation and the availability of reinsurance. It is straightfor- 
ward to consider other effects as well, by explaining the effect of decision pa- 
rameters or scenarios variables on outcomes, for example, the effect of chang- 
ing any of the base-case assumptions and parameter values given in table 4.4. 
As it turns out, many of these results are quite intuitive. For example, if target 
ruin probabilities are reduced, indicating more conservative behavior of insur- 
ance companies, insurance coverage will be reduced in the model city. Again, 
if reinsurance rates are increased, or if the terms of reinsurance are made other- 
wise less favorable (e.g., a larger retention rate is required), then direct in- 
surance coverage will be reduced. Finally, if additional reinsurance is made 
available, for example, because of new government guarantee programs, then 
additional insurance coverage will be offered. 
A key driver for the specific results obtained above is the set of earthquake 
events that underlie the probabilistic  structure of  annual losses through the 
resulting exceedance probability function. More generally, our assumptions on 
pricing, on mitigation adoption, and on other aspects of the decision processes 
of  the economic agents involved are central factors in determining the out- 
comes of our analysis. Many of these are the focus of ongoing studies based 
on the model city framework developed here. 
The results of this prototypical analysis highlight the basic points made ear- 
lier in this paper. It is critical to understand the nestedness that exists between 
various policy instruments and scenario variables and the decision processes 
of the economic agents involved. If, for example, cost-effective mitigation is 
available, it has a double effect. First, it will be attractive for propertyowners 
to adopt. Second, because of its effect on both expected losses and the tail of 
the exceedance probability function, it will lead to increased availability and 
affordability of insurance and reinsurance. This will yield significant efficiency 
gains in both an expected (ex ante) sense as well as in the worst case (ex post). 
The complexity of this nestedness supports reliance on decentralized decision 
making and market forces where possible. It should also be clear, however, 
that science-based and credible risk-assessment procedures are critical to the 
outcome of  this process. Otherwise, one or more of the economic actors in- 
volved could be significantly biasing decisions that have nested consequences. 
The ultimate  outcome could undermine  the  market  or the  viability  of  the 
agents involved. 
4.5  A Proposed Program for Dealing with Catastrophic Risks 
In this concluding section, we describe a strategy for managing catastrophic 
risks that builds on the analysis in the previous section and suggests the types 
of analyses that can be undertaken using the conceptual framework outlined 
above. One must involve other stakeholders and policy instruments to comple- 
ment the use of insurance in reducing losses while providing protection once 
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proving risk estimates, evaluating alternative mitigation measures, encourag- 
ing the adoption of  mitigation measures, and broadening protection against 
catastrophic losses. 
4.5.1  Improving Risk Estimates 
There are two principal reasons why insurers will benefit from improved 
estimates of the risks associated with catastrophes. By obtaining better data on 
the probabilities and consequences of these events, insurers will be able to set 
their premiums more accurately and tailor their portfolio to reduce the chances 
of insolvency. Providing more accurate information on the risks also reduces 
the asymmetry of information between insurers and other providers of capital, 
such as reinsurers and the financial investment community. Investors are more 
likely to supply capital if they are more confident in the estimates of the risks 
provided to them by the insurers. 
Today, there are a growing number of  catastrophe models that have been 
utilized to generate data on the likelihood of and expected damage to different 
communities or regions from disasters of  different magnitudes or intensities. 
Each  model uses  different assumptions, different methodologies,  different 
data, and different parameters in generating its results. These conflicting re- 
sults make it difficult for investors to feel comfortable investing their money 
in financial instruments associated with catastrophic risk. In order to better 
understand why these models differ, we must attempt to reconcile these differ- 
ences in a more scientific manner than has been done until now. For example, 
bringing the leading modelers together with financial institutions to discuss 
how their data are generated may reduce the mystery that currently surrounds 
these efforts. 
Another way  to make the investment community more comfortable is to 
be as conservative as possible in estimating future losses when developing an 
exceedance probability (EP) curve. This will make it highly likely that the 
actual damage will be less than the predicted amounts. By simulating a number 
of different loss scenarios using an EP curve, one can determine the prices that 
would have to be charged to the insurer or reinsurer purchasing specific finan- 
cial instruments in order to yield an attractive rate of return to investors. This 
type of analysis should enable one to contrast the relative benefits and costs 
of act-of-God bonds with traditional reinsurance and other ways of  financing 
catastrophic losses, such as purchasing options on the Chicago Board of Trade, 
purchasing federal reinsurance, or negotiating finite risk arrangements. 
4.5.2  Evaluating Alternative Mitigation Measures 
Mitigation is a desirable way to manage catastrophic risks because it allevi- 
ates the problem at the source. If  experts were able to design a completely 
humcane-proof structure, there would be no need for insurance against this 
risk. This is a desirable objective, but one highly unlikely to be achieved in 
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The first step is to determine which mitigation measures are likely to be cost 
effective.  This is not easy to do in practice, as illustrated by the case of shutters. 
Storm shutters can be an effective measure to protect a building during a hum- 
cane; however, someone must close and secure them prior to the hurricane. 
Furthermore, they must meet current wind-resistance standards and be prop- 
erly installed. Finally, by themselves, shutters may reduce losses slightly, but, 
if combined with complete wall protection, an aerodynamic roof structure, and 
good roof-to-wall and wall-to-foundation connections, the benefits could be 
substantial.14 
The second step is to examine the effect of specific mitigation measures on 
the reduction in losses through simulations similar to the ones described above. 
One can then undertake sensitivity analyses by examining the effect of a spe- 
cific mitigation measure on different EP curves and other design features of 
the property. Such analyses will then translate into estimated reductions in ex- 
pected losses. This should enable insurers to pass on the savings to the property- 
owner in the form of reduced premiums, lower deductibles, andor higher lim- 
its of coverage. 
4.5.3  Encouraging the Adoption of Mitigation Measures 
It is often necessary to undertake audits and inspections in order to avoid 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. With respect to properties at 
risk, one way to encourage the adoption of cost-effective loss-reduction mea- 
sures is to have them incorporated in building codes and provide a seal of 
approval to each structure that meets or exceeds these standards. To institution- 
alize such a procedure, financial institutions could require an inspection and 
certification of the facility against natural hazards as a condition for issuing a 
mortgage. This process would be similar in concept to termite and radon in- 
spections normally required when property is financed. 
The success of such a program requires the support of the building industry 
and a cadre of well-qualified inspectors to provide accurate information as to 
whether existing codes and standards are being met. To  reduce their losses 
from disasters, insurers may  want to limit coverage only to those structures 
that are given a seal of approval. If budget constraints prevent propertyowners 
from investing in these mitigation measures, then the bank can provide funds 
through a home-improvement loan with a payback period identical to the life 
of the mortgage. 
4.5.4  Broadening Protection against Catastrophic Losses 
New sources of capital from the private and public sectors have the possibil- 
ity  of  providing  insurers with  guaranteed funds  against losses from cata- 
strophic events so as to alleviate their concerns that they may be insolvent from 
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the next major disaster. Some instruments provide funds to the insurer should 
they suffer a catastrophic loss. J. P. Morgan and Nationwide Insurance success- 
fully negotiated such a transaction, Nationwide borrowing $400 million from 
J. P.  Morgan. This money was placed in a trust fund composed of U.S.  Treasury 
securities. Nationwide pays a higher than normal interest rate on these funds 
in  return for having the ability to issue up to $400 million in  surplus notes 
to help pay for the losses should a catastrophe occurs (Kunreuther 1998). As 
pointed out above, such instruments as the USAA act-of-God bonds have re- 
cently been floated, and other catastrophic bonds are now being initiated (Doh- 
erty 1997). 
The multiyear catastrophic bonds that have recently been proposed promise 
a relatively high rate of return compared to high-yield bonds. Other financial 
arrangements such as catastrophic insurance  futures contracts and call spreads 
introduced by the Chicago Board of Trade in 1992 enable an insurer to hedge 
against underwriting risk by  attracting capital from insurance and noninsur- 
ance  segments  of  the  economy  (Cummins and  Geman  1995; Harrington, 
Mann, and Niehaus 1995).15 The Catastrophic Risk Exchange (CATEX) cre- 
ates a marketplace where insurers, brokers, and the self-insured can swap units 
of their catastrophe risks by region and peril. For example, an insurer could 
swap units of California earthquake for Florida windstorm (Insurance Services 
Office 1996). 
The evaluation of these instruments through the simulations described above 
may  provide an understanding  of  the opportunities of  using  a combination 
of insurance, reinsurance, financial instruments, and government-related pro- 
grams to encourage cost-effective mitigation and infuse new capital into the 
system. Insurers could supplement traditional reinsurance with these guaran- 
teed sources of funding when their losses exceed a certain level. This would 
relax (implicit or explicit) solvency constraints and stimulate additional cover- 
age in high-risk areas. 
Finally, we note that simulation modeling of the sort proposed here must 
rely on solid theoretical foundations in order to delimit the boundaries of what 
is interesting and implementable in a market economy. Such foundations will 
apply, not only to the traditional issues of capital markets and the insurance 
sector, but also to the decision processes of insurance and reinsurance compa- 
nies, public officials, and propertyowners in determining levels of mitigation, 
insurance coverage, and other protective activities. Achieving an integrated un- 
derstanding of the aggregate effect of these decision processes and the under- 
lying hazards has been  our central focus. We have argued that better risk- 
assessment tools, including the advances in the micromodeling of hazards and 
15. To  date, the  Chicago Board  of Trade  has not had much success in  selling these futures 
contracts. Recently, it introduced a new option based on the value of an  index compiled by Prop- 
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mitigation measures described in the present paper, hold considerable potential 
for increasing our understanding of these issues and promoting the design of 
better programs for catastrophic risk management. 
Appendix A 
Decision Rules for Insurance and Reinsurance 
This appendix describes the rules used for making insurance and reinsurance 
decisions in the simulation studies undertaken for the model city. We  focus 
first on the insurance companies in the model city and describe how these com- 
panies are assumed to decide on the size of their book of business (the extent 
of the coverage they offer in the model city) and the amount of reinsurance 
they purchase. Premium levels are assumed to be set on the basis of  a fixed 
loading on expected losses. We  consider two basic approaches: a safety-first 
approach based on a specified probable maximum loss (or PML) rule and a 
related expected-utility-maximization  rule. 
Assumptions concerning the Book of Business for Insurers 
We  assume that  each insurer begins with  a base-case book of  business, 
which is a set of properties that it might consider insuring in the model city. 
For the small, medium, large, and other insurer, this base-case book of business 
serves as the reservoir of risks that the insurer may take on. If  the insurer can 
take on its full book of business, it is assumed to do so (i.e., it is assumed that 
the loading factors associated with premiums provide a fair return on reserves 
invested to cover the associated risks). If, however, the insurer chooses not to 
offer this full coverage in the model city (e.g., because it cannot meet its target 
ruin probability or PML at the full book of business), then we assume that the 
insurer reduces its coverage until its desired coverage limit is reached. 
To compute various quantities of  interest, we  need the distribution of  the 
random variable of  losses for an insurance company as its book of business 
changes. For analytic convenience, we assume that coverage reduction is ac- 
complished in a random order in each category of property insured: if the in- 
surer is insuring a book of business of “size” ae[O,  11 and its original or full 
book of business faced a loss distribution of  L, then the random variable of 
losses L(a)  when its book of business is of size ae[O,  11 is just L(a)  = aL. 
Thus, denoting the cumulative probability distribution function (cdf) of  L(a) 
by F(x;  a)  = Pr{L(a)  5  x],  we see that Pr{L(a) 5  x} = Pr{aL 5  x} = Pr{L 
5  xh},  with the result that F(x; a)  = F[(x/a)],  where F is the cdf of the 
original full book of  business for the insurer. Naturally, F  will depend on a 
number of factors, including mitigation, amount of deductibles, and other pol- 
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full book of business for an insurer, the cdf for any other size book of business 
is analytically available. 
PML Rule without Reinsurance 
Define the exceedance probability  (or EP) curve for losses for a particular 
insurer with book of business of size ae[O,  11 as EP(x; a)  = Pr{L(a) >  x) = 
1 -  F(x;  a)  = 1 -  F[(x/a)]. Thus, interpreting the PML rule as taking on the 
maximum-size book of business that does not produce an exceedance probabil- 
ity in excess of a given “target ruin probability,” we determine the size of the 
book of business offered by a PML insurer when no reinsurance is available as 
the solution a*  to 
A +  “Po  1 - .[  a  ] =  P*, 
where A = initial reserves; po = premium income from the full book of busi- 
ness for the insurer in question, or (1 + 1,)  X expected losses of the full book 
of business (so apo  is the premium income for the book of business of size a); 
1,  = insurance-policy loading factor; and p* = target ruin probability. 
PML Rule with Reinsurance 
A number of assumptions will be made in this case: (a)  Reinsurers will offer 
a limited amount of coverage A = L, -  Lo, where Lo is the lower attachment 
point and L, is the upper attachment point of the reinsurance contract. (b)  The 
reinsurer makes the added stipulation that the insurance company retains some 
fraction b of the worst-case-scenario  event. In other words, the lower attach- 
ment point  &(a) = bLWC(a),  where Lwc(a)  is the loss associated with  the 
worst-case event, and be[O,  11 is the required retention level. We take the worst- 
case event to be the loss associated with EP(x; a)  = pwc  (e.g., EP[x; a] = 
.00001). Thus, Lwc(a)  is the loss that solves 1 -  F[LWC(a);  a]  = pwc. 
In choosing the amount of reinsurance and the size of the book of business 
it wishes to purchase (at a fixed loading above expected losses in the reinsur- 
ance layer), the insurer will make one of the following choices: (a)  If the cap 
on A is not binding, EP[(Lo + A)/a; a]  = 1 -  .[(Lo  + A)/a] <  p*,  then the 
insurer is assumed to purchase a reinsurance contract with attachment points 
Lo and L:, where L:  solves 1 -  F(L:) = p*;  that is, the insurer will then take 
on the entire portfolio, a = 1. (b)  If the cap on A is binding, then the insurer 
will adjust a  until its PML is satisfied. This amounts to finding a*  solving 
=  P*,  1 
1 - .[A  + “PO  -  ‘Premium  +  ‘Payoff 
a 
where A  = initial reserves;  po = premiums  = (1 + I,)  X  expected  losses; 
Rpremlum  = reinsurance premium  = (1 + ZR)jiA[l -  F(Wa)]dL,  where Lo = 
Lo(a)  = bLwC(a)  and L, = L,(ol) = Lo(a)  + A; R,,,  = reinsurance payoff; 
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L  1 
Note that the integral determining the reinsurance premium determines ex- 
pected losses between the two attachment points L&a)  and L,(a).  Once the cdf 
of losses F(x) is known for the full book of business, it is straightforward  to 
solve the above for the optimal size a for the PML insurer. Note that Lo(a)  = 
do,  and define L* by 1 -  F(L*) =  p*.  Then, changing the variable of integra- 
tion above to x = Lh,  we can rewrite this expression in the form: 
L,(U) 
A  +  apo - a(1 +  lR)jLF[l  - F(x)]dr  +  A  =  aL*. 
In particular, if L,(a)  = Lo(&)  + A = aLo + A so that all available reinsurance 
is purchased, then the upper limit of integration becomes Lo + (Ah). 
Expected Utility Rules 
If, instead of a PML choice rule, an insurance company uses an expected- 
utility  rule, similar results to the above are attained. For example, when re- 
insurance is not available, an expected-utility maximizer would solve for the 
optimal book of business by solving the following problem: 
Maximize{E[U(A,  +  apo - aL)]la&[O,  ll), 
where the expectation is with respect to the underlying random variable  of 
losses L. If we assume a CAM  utility function, U(W)  = -e-ky then the task 
becomes solving the first-order condition below for a: 
where po = (1 + 2,)  ,,[  1 -  F(L)]dL.  Intuitively, the expected-utility rule mim- 
ics the PML rule in that, as risk aversion increases, the optimal book of busi- 
ness a* decreases, corresponding to an equivalent PML insurer with lower 
target ruin probability p*. 
The case where reinsurance is available is modeled similarly. Here, the in- 
surer would solve for the optimal a and the optimal amount of reinsurance to 
purchase by solving 
Max  EUIAo +  poa - &(a)  - P(a)], 
aslo.ll 
where P(a)  = (1 +  I,)  ,s[  1 -  F(L)]dL  is the reinsurance premium, and where 
L,(a)  is the loss exposure for the insurance company given its reinsurance deci- 
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L,(a) =  aL  for  aL <  La(a), 
L,(a) =  L,(a)  for  La(a) I  aL I  L,(a), 
L,(a) =  L,(a) +  aL - L,(a)  for  L  > &(a), 
L,(a) is constrained by the retention-level requirement that L,(u) = bLWC(a), 
and L,(a)  is constrained by the maximum coverage offered, that is, LI(a)  5 
Lo(&)  + A. Again here, the expected-utility-maximizing rule gives rise to simi- 
lar behavior as for a corresponding PML rule: as risk aversion increases, the 
size of  the optimal portfolio decreases, and the  amount of reinsurance pur- 
chased increases. 
Appendix B 
The RMS-  Wharton (RWP)  Software 
RWP Earthquake is a refined model originally developed at Stanford Univer- 
sity and licensed exclusively to Risk Management Solutions (RMS) in 1988. 
The model simulates earthquakes and the transfer of energy from a rupture to 
a site and then calculates the damage to insured properties. The RMS modeling 
framework from which RWP Earthquake is derived is quite general and has 
been adapted in RWP to study a particular city, the model city, described in the 
text. RWP assesses three factors when it analyzes earthquake risks: (1) hazard 
and exposure data; (2) vulnerability; and (3) financial risk. 
Hazard and Exposure Data 
To calculate loss, RWP must first determine the modified Mercalli intensity 
(MMI), or the intensity of shaking at a site due to an earthquake. There are 
three factors in determining the amount of  shaking at a site: (1) the earth- 
quake’s source; (2)  attenuation of seismic energy; and (3) local soil conditions 
(see fig. 4B.1). The first three items are enough for “what if” types or determin- 
istic types of analyses that do not consider the element of time. To  answer the 
question “How much am I likely to lose in X years?’  the fourth factor, recur- 
rence relationship, is needed to estimate how often earthquakes occur. 
Earthquake  Sources. The first questions that need to be  answered in a loss 
calculation are, Where is the earthquake? and, How big  is the earthquake? 
RWP provides these answers in the form of a database of seismic sources. Each 
seismic source contains geographic information about a region  or geologic 
structure with the potential to generate earthquakes. It also stores the maxi- 
mum credible magnitude for an earthquake on that source as well as recurrence 184  Paul R. Kleindorfer and Howard C. Kunreuther 
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Fig. 4B.1  Determinants of earthquake intensity at a remote site 
parameters indicating average occurrence intervals for each event magnitude. 
This information comes primarily from public data expanded by  proprietary 
sources and research by RMS engineers. 
RWP models a seismic source as either a line or an area. Line sources are 
used when seismicity is associated with a well-defined geologic structure, usu- 
ally shallow  faults with a surface expression. Area sources cover a broader 
geographic region and treat that area as one unit. These sources assume that 
earthquakes can occur anywhere within the region with equal probability and 
are used when seismicity is associated with many faults that individually are 
too poorly characterized to be modeled by themselves. Area sources are also 
used when seismicity occurs along a dipping plane (rather than vertically) or 
when seismicity is not clearly associated with a geologic structure. 
Attenuation of  Seismic Energy. Once the size of an earthquake and its distance 
from a location are determined, RWP must calculate how much energy is re- 
leased at the rupture and, of that energy, how much actually reaches the site. 
RWP calculates this level of ground shaking using attenuation relations  that 
estimate the drop in energy with distance from an earthquake. These attenua- 
tions can differ by the type of earthquake or by region. 
An earthquake of a particular  magnitude generates ground motion. Peak 
ground acceleration (PGA) is a measurement of the maximum ground move- 
ment at a location. As the distance from an earthquake source increases, the 
ground movement, or PGA, decreases. RWP calculates the PGA for a location 
on the basis of the seismic sources and the attenuation of seismic energy. 
Local Soil Conditions. The third factor in determining the amount of shaking 
at a site is the potential amplification of ground motion by soil conditions pres- 
ent at the site. After geocoding a location, RWP retrieves  data on the local 
conditions and potential hazards for that site. The local geology can have a 
major effect on ground motion. Buildings standing on bedrock will usually 
sustain less damage than those on water-saturated alluvial deposits or on arti- 
ficial fill. There are four “soil” classes used in RWP: (1) bedrock; (2) shallow 185  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
alluvium; (3) deep alluvium; and (4) bay mudartificial fill. The names given 
these classes do not always reflect the true geology at the site but refer to the 
relative amplification potential of the underlying material. 
A simplified analogy  helps  illustrate how  different materials can amplify 
ground motion. Imagine a plate with a thick chocolate cake on it. Imagine a 
second, identical plate with a block of Jello of the same size as the cake. Put a 
box of matches on top of each and then slide the plates back and forth at the 
same speed. Even though the initial motion is the same, the matchbox on the 
Jello will shake more violently. 
Measures of Ground Shaking. When a fault ruptures, it causes waves of ground 
motion.  One way  of  measuring the strength of this motion is the PGA, the 
maximum pulse of  ground  shaking at a location. Instrumental records from 
past earthquakes have provided enough data to define PGA-based attenuations 
for many regions. RWP uses established PGA attenuations wherever possible. 
In some regions, however, the limited (or nonexistent) PGA data are not 
sufficient to define a reliable  attenuation. In these cases, ground shaking is 
given in terms of a subjective scale, the MMI. The MMI is a subjective measure 
of how severe the damage from an earthquake is on a scale of I-XII.  For ex- 
ample, an MMI of I1 is defined as being felt by few persons at rest, especially 
on upper floors of tall buildings. An MMI of VI is defined as being felt by all, 
except drivers of cars, where some heavy furniture moves and there is slight 
damage to poor-quality  masonry, particularly  chimneys. Ground shaking in 
RWP is defined in terms of MMI. RWP converts the level of  PGA for a site to 
MMI and modifies the intensity based on amplification by the local soil condi- 
tions. The ultimate outcome of the hazard portion of the earthquake model is 
the MMI experienced by each location. 
Vulnerability Assessment 
In the second step of an earthquake analysis, RWP uses information about 
several factors to assess potential damage resulting from local ground shaking 
(MMI): the structural characteristics of a location; the type of  contents; and 
the social function of the building. The potential damage is first expressed as 
the class mean-damage ratio. The class mean-damage ratio is then used to cal- 
culate  the  building  mean-damage  ratio,  the  content  damage  ratio,  and  the 
business-interruption-damage ratio. The ultimate outcome of the vulnerability 
assessment is a determination of the damage distribution or damage curve for 
a particular building. 
Class Mean-Damage Ratio. First, given a particular MMI and a construction 
class for a specific building, RWP retrieves a class mean-damage ratio. A class 
damage ratio is the average damage expected for a specific construction class 
given a particular MMI. A 10 percent class damage ratio means that the cost 
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actual losses to individual buildings may be very different than the class dam- 
age ratio. For example, a class damage ratio of  10 percent for a population of 
one hundred buildings could equate to ten buildings that are total losses and 
ninety that sustained no damage. Other factors that often help determine the 
class damage ratio are the number of stories and the occupancy type. The dam- 
age ratios are determined by the damage table selected in RWP during an anal- 
ysis. RWP utilizes the PML table for this purpose. 
The PML methodology as expressed in  RWP is based on published work 
performed by Karl Steinbrugge (1982). Dr. Steinbrugge’s work has formed the 
foundation of generally accepted earthquake expected-loss analysis, including 
the regulatory filings required by the state of California. RMS has used Stein- 
brugge’s intensity versus damage relations as the core of the PML computation 
performed by RWP. Note that, as defined in RWP, the PML methodology repre- 
sents a significant improvement over the traditional PML methodology. PML 
is a more conservative approach; estimated losses will be higher for all con- 
struction classes except wood frame. 
Building Mean-Damage Ratio. RWP’s next step is to modify the class damage 
ratio according to four additional types of information to calculate the building 
mean-damage ratio, or the average damage expected for a specific building. 
The four additional  types of  information  are the following:  (1) secondary 
building characteristics, such as ornamentation, which can increase or decrease 
the damage; (2) year of construction or upgrade, information that helps deter- 
mine building-code  requirements  and  can  also increase  the  damage ratio; 
(3) landslide  and liquefaction,  which can increase damage ratios  if ground 
shaking is sufficient to trigger them; and (4) distance to fault, since surface 
rupture may contribute to the mean-damage ratio if a location lies very close 
to the fault. 
Content Damage Ratio. RWP calculates the content damage ratio by  multi- 
plying the building damage ratio by  the content modifier. For each class of 
construction, there are four content modifiers, referred to as rate grades. The 
rate grades range from 1 to 4, with 1 being fragile and 4 being least damage- 
able. Depending on the type of construction entered, RWP multiplies a specific 
number by the building damage ratio to calculate the contents damage ratio. 
Financial  .Risk Assessment 
The final step of the earthquake analysis is to estimate financial risk. RWP 
used the building mean-damage ratio and the total level of uncertainty to create 
a damage curve for the building. The uncertainty is determined by the quality 
of the location data: Is the construction class provided? How many secondary 
building characteristics are known? At what level is hazard data available? and 
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resulting in a narrower range of loss estimates. High uncertainty, such as not 
knowing the construction class of a building, results in a broad damage curve 
with a wide range of potential losses. 
Out of  four modes that can be used to determine the financial risk, RWP 
uses the distributed mode. The distributed mode is the most sophisticated mode 
that  combines  the  damage  curve with  the  financial  structure to produce  a 
weighted average for each layer of the financial structure (e.g., deductible, pri- 
mary insurance, coinsurance layer, and so forth). In essence, it distributes the 
potential losses to each layer of the financial structure on the basis of the proba- 
bility that the loss may penetrate a specific layer. The total specified loss when 
using the distributed mode equals the total specified loss when using the ex- 
pected mode, but the loss per layer may differ. The greater the difference, the 
more uncertainty in the estimation of financial risk. 
The distributed mode considers the probability  of  loss for each particular 
layer. This mode can produce results  that are at first glance confusing. For 
example, consider the distributed-loss calculation of a $100,000 deductible in 
the event of an expected loss equal to $200,000.  Using the expected mode, the 
loss to the insured would be the full value of the $100,000 deductible. Using 
the distributed mode, the loss to the insured may be slightly lower than the 
$100,000 deductible after the probabilities of loss have been factored in. Fac- 
toring in the probabilities of loss allows the model to reflect the chance, even 
if it is slight, that the loss may be under the $100,000 deductible. This causes 
the probabilistic loss to the insured to be slightly lower than the full amount of 
the deductible. 
As another example, consider a policy with a 10 percent deductible. If the 
expected loss to the policy were 9 percent, no loss to the policy would be 
calculated in the expected mode or the percentile mode. However, the distrib- 
uted mode would factor in the probability  that the loss would exceed the ex- 
pected loss of 9 percent and may show a small loss to the policy. The distrib- 
uted mode of financial loss assessment allows RWP users to understand the 
statistically predicted losses for various layers of a policy. 
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Comment  James R. Garven 
Kleindorfer and Kunreuther provide a very useful and insightful approach to 
evaluating the role of  insurance and other policy instruments for managing 
catastrophic risk. Their findings derive from a sophisticated and highly detailed 
modeling  process  that  stochastically  generates  earthquake  scenarios  for  a 
model city, which in  turn specifies the probabilistic  structure of losses and 
corresponding implications for insurer solvency and stability. The Kleindorfer 
and Kunreuther model does a superb job of capturing the interdependencies 
that exist between various policy instruments, scenario variables, and decision 
processes of firms and consumers. Consequently, their model provides a useful 
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framework that can be readily expanded to consider the potential role of alter- 
native approaches to funding and mitigation. 
In what follows, I will offer some suggestions concerning how the present 
analysis could be usefully modified and perhaps even extended. Specifically, 
I  will  offer comments concerning mitigation  incentives, insurer objectives, 
and an interesting “real-world’’ application of the Kleindorfer and Kunreuther 
model. 
Incentives for Mitigation 
The apparent disregard shown historically by banks and insurers when fund- 
ing and insuring properties located in catastrophe-prone areas is appalling. As 
the authors point out, this has increased the severity of  losses when catastro- 
phes have actually occurred. 
It may be that regulatory complicity (in the form of rate suppression and 
cross-subsidies) causes consumers to not fully consider the risks associated 
with investing in catastrophe-prone properties. Consequently, insurance prices 
may falsely convey the nature of the risks that consumers assume in deciding 
to build in  such areas. The fact that the Florida joint underwriting authority 
acquired so much market share in so short a period of time is clear evidence 
of severe adverse selection and obviously very bad news from a mitigation per- 
spec  tive  . 
Insurance-Company Objectives 
The paper takes as given the notion, advanced originally more than two de- 
cades ago by Stone (1973), that insurers will seek to maximize the expected 
return on capital, subject to complying with (arbitrarily parameterized)  sol- 
vency and stability constraints. Such an approach is logically consistent with 
recent findings that insurers apparently factor in the probable maximum loss 
associated with a catastrophe when they determine how many policies to write. 
Kleindorfer and Kunreuther also show in an appendix that their results are 
apparently qualitatively robust to alternative specifications of the firm’s objec- 
tive function; for example, one could apply the expected-utility  hypothesis 
without any apparent loss of generality. 
I would encourage the authors to consider as well a financial market setting 
as an alternative framework for modeling insurer decisions. The adoption of a 
financial market setting would afford a number of  analytic advantages. For 
example, it would provide an internally consistent framework for introducing 
such alternative financial instruments as act-of-God bonds and insurance deriv- 
atives directly into the analysis. Furthermore, a financial market setting also 
makes it much easier to consider important incentive effects associated with 
taxation and solvency. Studies based on financial market models (e.g., Mayers 
and Smith 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant 1997) have shown that insurer 
willingness  to  bear  risk may  be significantly influenced by  factors such as 
asymmetries in the tax code and variation in ownership structure as well as the 191  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
risk of insolvency. Furthermore,  limited liability and tax asymmetries create 
“kinky,” option-like payoffs that also convey systematically different risk in- 
centives for stock versus mutual organizations (see Garven 1992).  The incen- 
tive effects documented in these studies become even more pronounced in the 
face of catastrophic risks. 
An Interesting “Real-World” Application 
A very interesting “out-of-the-box’’ application of the Kleindorfer and Kun- 
reuther model would involve the evaluation of the optimality (or lack thereof) 
of  the California  Earthquake Association financial structure  (see their table 
4.1). Given the conceptual framework provided by the Kleindorfer and Kun- 
reuther model, does the CEA financial structure make sense? If  not, would 
there be better ways to parameterize it from the perspectives of  funding and 
mitigation? 
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Comment  Dwight Jaffee 
Catastrophe insurance in the United States (and other countries) is, generally 
speaking,  not provided by  private companies operating  in free markets.  In- 
stead, government entities and regulators (state or federal) have become major 
players in virtually all such markets. This is perplexing since standard theory 
would  suggest  that  insurance  for low-probability,  high-consequence  events 
should create an active demand (by consumers and business firms seeking to 
reduce their catastrophe risk) and an aggressive supply (by profit-seeking  in- 
surance companies) that would support such a market. An accurate understand- 
ing of why private insurance markets for catastrophes fail to operate is critical 
for evaluating how best to deal with this failure. Otherwise, we cannot know 
whether the government-based solutions, now adopted for hurricanes in Flor- 
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ida and Hawaii, for earthquakes in California, and for floods across the United 
States, are the best available solutions. 
This paper, by Paul Kleindorfer and Howard Kunreuther, provides important 
advances in understanding some of  the important elements that are creating 
the market failure. In particular, the paper makes important contributions in 
two primary areas. First, it focuses on the decision processes of the key stake- 
holders and on how the interaction of these processes has made it difficult for 
private firms to manage catastrophe-insurance risks. Second, it focuses on new 
methods for modeling catastrophe-risk management. I discuss these in turn. 
Behavioral Insurance: The Decision Processes of Stakeholders 
Kleindorfer and Kunreuther focus on how the behavior of various stakehold- 
ers in  the  catastrophe-insurance  market-the  insurance companies,  insured 
individuals,  and  government  regulators-might  vary  from that  implied  by 
expected-utility theory. This research area might be called behavioral insur- 
ance, in parallel with the new field of behavioral  finance. Indeed, insurance 
market anomalies, such as the failure of private markets for catastrophe insur- 
ance, can be as interesting and challenging to explain as the well-known  fi- 
nancial market anomalies. 
Kleindorfer and Kunreuther on Behavioral Insurance 
The authors are persuasive in arguing that behavioral factors may play an 
important role in explaining the catastrophe  market anomaly. For example, 
they point out that consumers may understate the probability of a catastrophe 
(“it will not happen to me”) while insurers may operate under a “probable- 
maximum-loss’’ constraint to limit their risk of ruin. These factors reduce both 
the demand for and supply of catastrophe insurance. These factors may also 
explain why consumers can complain that insurance is too expensive and the 
companies unfair while at the same time failing to carry out economically sen- 
sible mitigation investments. 
Kleindorfer  and Kunreuther also emphasize that further effects can arise 
owing to interconnections on a systemwide basis. They point out, for example, 
that construction firms, local building-code inspectors, homeowners, insurance 
companies, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders (including Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac) have all chosen to overlook important cases in which homes 
have not been built to code. This was clearly revealed during Hurricane An- 
drew as improperly constructed roofs blew away. 
The Government and Behavioral Insurance 
The authors indicate that the government can be a constructive force in re- 
versing some of the problems of the catastrophe-insurance industry, which is 
certainly true. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that most govern- 
ment disaster-relief  programs create highly adverse incentives both for catas- 193  Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry 
trophe insurance and for the ex ante mitigation of the effects of catastrophes. 
In the extreme case, if the government pays for all uninsured losses, then there 
is a positive incentive to place activity in risky locations and not to carry private 
catastrophe insurance. This is not an easy problem to fix since it is difficult for 
a government to claim, with credibility, that it will not provide disaster relief 
in the future. 
It is interesting in this regard that the Italian government is currently at- 
tempting to reduce the budgetary effect of disaster relief by making catastro- 
phe insurance mandatory for all homeowners. Under current proposals, the 
premiums will be paid through a surtax on other casualty insurance. In this 
case, the Italian budget may benefit, but, since the premiums will not vary by 
specific location, the incentive to locate in hazardous areas will continue. On 
the other hand, different problems are created when individuals are forced to 
pay directly for mandatory insurance, as illustrated by the number of uninsured 
motorists and the assigned risk pools in U.S. auto-insurance markets. This all 
reinforces the authors’ basic point that it is important to consider behavioral 
factors when determining the proper role for government in insurance markets. 
New Methods for Modeling Catastrophe-Risk Management 
The second primary contribution of the Kleindorfer and Kunreuther paper 
is a prototype model for managing catastrophe risk, one based on recent devel- 
opments in risk assessment and information technology. The model measures 
the exposure to earthquake risk of a city that is a virtual mirror, in terms of the 
number and mix of structures, of Oakland, California. The model includes an 
insurance  industry  (with firms of  differing  size), reinsurance  in alternative 
amounts, and mitigation in alternative amounts. Model results are generated 
by Monte Car10 simulations, which determine expected and worst-case losses 
for each stakeholder group. 
Model Results 
The model provides reasonable results in terms of the effect of varying the 
amount and cost of reinsurance available to the insurance companies. In partic- 
ular, as the cost of reinsurance rises or its availability falls, the insurance com- 
panies reduce the amount of primary coverage that they are willing to offer. 
The model also provides intriguing results concerning the benefits of mitiga- 
tion. As expected, the model shows that the worst-case losses decline as the 
degree of mitigation is improved. However, the model also shows no benefits 
to mitigation on average, which is surprising. This result arises because mitiga- 
tion is measured in the model by the degree of adherence to the building codes. 
In particular, the model ignores potential mitigation that is not code related 
while including the cost of code-based retrofits that have no mitigation bene- 
fits. In other words, properly interpreted, the model is showing that ineficienr 
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future work, however, to measure the potential benefits of eficient mitigation. 
Further Comments on the Model 
This model is really a remarkable feat, and my  hat is off to the authors. 
Nevertheless, there are features that  could be and probably  should be  im- 
proved. I will focus on two key areas, the role of prices in the model and certain 
missing model features. 
The model determines the premium prices for both insurance and reinsur- 
ance as a markup over the expected loss for each property. The loading factor 
for the markup is exogenously determined to be 100 percent. In particular, the 
premium prices do not necessarily clear the market, and it seems that they are 
generally below the market-clearing level. It is hard to know how much this 
affects the model's results for reinsurance and mitigation. In any case, it would 
be useful to have a version of the model with market-clearing prices. As a re- 
lated matter, it might also be useful to allow new entry into the insurance mar- 
ket to occur as a function of the profit margins being earned by the current par- 
ticipants. 
There are several other features of earthquake-insurance markets that might 
be useful to incorporate in future versions of  the model. I simply list these 
briefly: (a)  As already mentioned, government disaster relief programs create 
an incentive to locate activity in hazardous areas and not to buy earthquake 
insurance. (b)  Fraud can be an important part of  the cost of  settling claims. 
(c)  Alternative contracts can provide more or less coverage and be more or 
less subject to fraud. These ideas illustrate the range of questions that can be 
potentially answered by  such models. I look forward to more results from 
Kleindorfer and Kunreuther as they continue their research in this area. 